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1 Introduction
Most OECD countries rely heavily on the public sector to provide insurance.1
Since insurance is essentially a private good, we may wonder why it is so.
The present paper is an attempt to answer that question. It is then a
contribution to the existing literature on the public provision of private
goods.
Typically, social insurance contributions are not related to risk but rather
to income levels. Social insurance thus implies redistribution in two ways
with mandatory participation. First, there is redistribution from low to
high risks because contributions do not depend on individual’s morbidity or
risk: higher-risk individuals pay less than their expected risk while lower-
risk individuals pay more. Second, since contributions increase with income,
higher-income individuals pay more than lower-income individuals even if
they have the same risk. The overall amount of redistribution will depend
on the covariance between risks and income.2
If risks are negatively related to income so that the poor face higher
risks on average then we have an obvious distributive argument for public
provision of social insurance. Moreover the existing literature has shown
that, contrarily to the tax principle (Guesnerie, 1995), it is not possible
to replicate the redistributive effect of social insurance through the income
tax.3 The reason is that redistributing through social insurance from low
to high risks does not involve the same distortion as redistributing directly
from the high-income to the low-income.
1As for health insurance, a recent OECD report reveals that for many countries a very
high proportion of health spendings were accounted for by the state (OECD Health Data
2001). According to this study in 1998 state spending as a proportion of total spending on
health was 80% in Germany, 89% in France, 67% in the Netherlands, 67% in Italy, 73% in
Austria, and 84% in Britain. In terms of total spendings, Germany spent 10% of GDP on
health, France spent 9.5% but Britain spent just 6.8%. As for pensions, Bo¨rsch-Supan et
al.(2001) report that the proportion of retirement benefits coming from public insurance
was on average 85% in Germany, 65% in Great-Britain, 50% in the Netherlands, 45% in
the US and 42% in Switzerland.
2See Wagstaff et al. (1999) for a recent international comparison of the redistributive
effect of health care systems; and Coronado et al (2000) for a study of the redistributive
effect of Social Security over lifetime in the US taking into account notably difference in
life expectancies.
3See Rochet(1991) and Cremer and Pestieau(1996) for the case where contributions are
not related to income, and Blomqvist and Horn (1984) and Petretto (1999) for income-
related contributions.
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According to this literature, the case for social insurance relies heavily
on the negative association between risks and income combined with a social
desire to redistribute from the rich to the poor. The natural questions are
therefore whether it is possible to give a justification for social insurance
when the poor do not necessarily face higher risk on average than the rich
and when there is no benevolent planner to impose this redistribution from
the rich to the poor. The purpose of this paper is to take up these issues
by focusing instead on the political justification for social insurance given
various possible relations between risks and income. We will show that,
unlike the normative approach, the political demand for social insurance is
stronger when risk and income are positively correlated.
For insurance to be publicly provided it must be supported by a majority.
There has been some work on the political economy of the public provision
of private goods, in particular health care. Usher (1977) considers public
provision uniform to all individuals and financed by a proportional income
tax so that given the positively skewed distribution of income a majority of
individuals benefit from public provision provided that the heterogeneity in
tastes for the particular good is not too high. Otherwise the redistributive
gain of public provision would be offset by the cost of uniform provision. To
accommodate this heterogeneity problem some authors have considered the
case where public provision can be supplemented by private consumption
(see Anderberg, 1999, Casamatta et al., 2000, Epple and Romano, 1996,
Peterson, 1986, Pauly, 1992, and Gouveia 1997). The main feature of these
papers is that the level of public provision will tend to reflect the preference
of the median voter with the implication that social insurance will be orga-
nized in the interests of the middle class. In particular in Gouveia (1997)
both the poor and the rich would like a lower public provision of health
insurance: the poor because there is an income effect and the rich because
they can get a better price with private insurance. Gouveia obtains the re-
sult that a majority will support a mixed provision of insurance. Anderberg
(1999) has the same result in a model where individuals differ only in their
risk and Casamatta et al. (2000) in a model where individuals differ only in
their income.
In this paper we shall consider individuals differing both in their income
and their risk of incurring the same damage. The model will thus describe
cost insurance rather than earnings insurance. That is, the benefit of insur-
ance is a reimbursement of the costs incurred but not a compensation for
earnings loss. This assumption, while keeping the model tractable, can be
justified empirically by the observation that the responsibility of providing
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earnings compensation has been partly shifted to the employer.4 We can
capture to some extent this aspect of insurance against earnings loss in our
model by modifying the contribution schedule of social insurance. Varying
the contribution scheme from proportional income taxes to uniform taxes we
can approximate the equivalence principle according to which benefits are
proportional to contributions. The main distinctive feature of our model is
that we assume away the income effect in the demand for insurance so that
we do not get the peculiarity that the poor favour less social insurance than
the middle class. We do this by adopting Yaari (1986,1987)’s dual theory
of choice under uncertainty (i.e., risk aversion without diminishing marginal
utility of income). Beside presenting independent interest, this modelling
of risk aversion will allow the derivation of a rich set of insights that could
hardly be obtained with the expected utility model. We shall also consider
the possibility to supplement social insurance with private insurance.
Another important difference with previous contributions is that we shall
take private insurance as imperfect. It is indeed surprising that most contri-
butions cited above either ignore the problem of adverse selection by assum-
ing perfect private insurance or assume pooling private insurance. However
insurance is plagued with adverse selection, which makes voluntary individ-
ual insurance inefficient and provides an efficiency argument for compulsory
social insurance.5 Indeed, in most OECD countries social insurance is com-
pulsory. Two major exceptions in health care are the Netherlands and the
US. In these countries, a significant portion of the population was not sub-
ject to compulsory health insurance.6 Given the increase in the number
of uninsured individuals, the Netherlands have adopted the Dekker reform
which aims to make insurance compulsory.
Our main results are twofold. First, we demonstrate that there is in
general a majority support for social insurance (regardless of the correlation
between risk and income) and that this majority support for social insurance
increases with risk aversion and is robust to any change to its redistributive
4In Germany, for example, employers have to pay 80-100 per cent of regular earnings
during the first six weeks of sickness.
5Although in many cases the stakes are high enough to induce the insurers to find out
consumers’ types, this may be institutionally impossible. Indeed in some countries it is
illegal to discriminate between consumers according to their genetic background. In 18
states of the US, legislation prevents insurers to deny insurance coverage or charge higher
premium on genetic grounds; whereas France has imposed a moratorium of 5 years on the
use of such tests (The Economist, 19 October 2000).
6In 1990, the proportion of the population covered by health social insurance was 70
per cent in the Netherlands and only 44 per cent in the US (see Besley and Gouveia, 1994,
Table 5, p. 216).
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component. Second, we show that a system where it is possible to supple-
ment a social insurance with voluntary private insurance is not politically
feasible with the dual theory of choice under risk whatever the distribution
of risk and income in the population. The reason is that due to its linearity
property the dual theory tends to produce corner solutions in optimization
problems, unlike the expected utility model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
the dual theory of choice under risk. Section 3 analyses social insurance
and private insurance as mutually exclusive options, and derives condition
for a majority to prefer social insurance against private insurance. Section
4 studies the case where social and private insurance can complement each
other and shows that such a top-up system is not politically feasible. Section
5 considers how the redistributive component of social insurance affects its
political support. Section 6 emphasizes the importance of adverse selection
in our analysis. Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
The economy is composed of a continuum of individuals who differ in their
income w ∈ [w,w] (with 1 ≤ w < w < ∞) and their probability of incurring
a damage θ ∈ [θ, θ] (with 0 ≤ θ < θ < 1). Risk and income are distributed
according to a continuous joint distribution function H(θ, w). All individuals
face the same damage d = 1 but with different probabilities.
There is no moral hazard since individuals cannot affect their probability
of accident which is fixed.7 However adverse selection is introduced by
assuming that each individual knows her own risk (i.e. value of θ) which
is private information. The insurance companies only know the marginal
distribution of risks in the population, which is denoted by F (θ). So F (θ) is
the fraction of the population with probability of accident less or equal to θ.
The mean risk is θµ =
∫ θ
θ θdF (θ) and the median risk is θm = F
−1(1/2). We
assume that the government also knows the mean risk θµ and can observe
income levels which are distributed according to the marginal distribution
function G(w). The mean income is wµ =
∫ w
w wdG(w) and the median
income is wm = G−1(1/2). Any insurance contract consists of a premium
π and a coverage rate δ ∈ [0, 1] which is the proportion of the damage
reimbursed.
7Moral hazard is assumed away because it is believed that it would affect private and
public insurance in the same way, and so it should not influence the choice between the
two systems.
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We model individuals’ risk preferences using Yaari (1987)’s dual theory
(DT). We first give a general description of this approach before applying
it to our model. Let wealth X be a random variable distributed over [x, x]
according to the distribution function Ψ(x). Yaari’s representation of prefer-
ences is dual to the expected utility theory (EU) in the sense that it is linear
in wealth but non linear in probabilities. Probabilities are transformed by a
function φ defined on the distribution function Ψ(x).8 More precisely, DT
preferences over X are given by
V (X) =
∫
x φ′(Ψ(x)) dΨ(x)
where φ(0) = 0, φ(1) = 1 and φ′(.) > 0. φ′(.) are non-negative weights
adding up to one. Attitude towards risk is conveyed entirely by the shape of
φ(.). Risk aversion is characterized by the concavity of φ(.), i.e. φ′′(.) < 0.9
In this case, bad outcomes (with low Ψ(X)) receive higher weights than
good outcomes (with high Ψ(X)). In other words, V (X) is the certainty-
equivalent of X computed as a weighted average of outcomes in which bad
outcomes are given high weight while good outcomes are given low weight.
Since V (X) is linear in wealth, this approach separates attitude towards
risk from attitude towards wealth and as we shall see shortly it allows the
derivation of a rich set of insights. We also know from Machina (1995) that
most (though not all) of the standard results in insurance theory are robust
to this departure from the expected utility hypothesis. There is however
a key difference related to the order of risk aversion.10When risk aversion
is of order 1 as in the DT, it could be optimal for a policyholder to buy
full insurance even above the fair price. This is because he derives positive
benefits from the last dollar of coverage. By contrast under EU, risk aversion
is of the second order and the benefit from the last dollar of coverage is zero.
Therefore nobody would find profitable to buy complete insurance slightly
above fair price in the EU model eventhough this is common practice.11
8Alternatively this probability transformation function could be defined on the decu-
mulative distribution function 1−Ψ such as in Yaari (1987).
9If the probability transformation function were defined on the decumulative distribu-
tion function, then risk aversion would be characterised by the convexity of φ(1−Ψ).
10For the definition of the order of risk aversion, see Segal and Spivak (1990). An
excellent survey of the various definitions of risk aversion is provided in Cohen (1995).
11Mossin (1968) was the first to point out this anomaly of the EU model. Note that in
our model with a fixed damage (d = 1), partial coverage is equivalent to a deductible.
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Another distinctive property of insurance under DT is that insurance cannot
be a Giffen good as in the EU model.12
We now apply DT to our simple two-state setting. For an individual
with income w facing a damage d = 1 with probability θ, insurance contract
with premium π > 0 and coverage rate δ ∈ [0, 1] yields the random variable
X = (w− π − (1− δ), θ;w− π, 1− θ). We thus define the utility associated
to this insurance contract as
V (π, δ; θ, w) = φ(θ)(w − π − (1− δ)) + (1− φ(θ))(w − π)
= w − π − φ(θ)(1− δ)
where risk aversion is represented by φ(θ) > θ (and 1−φ(θ) < 1−θ). In this
paper, we further assume that φ(θ) = (1+α)θ, with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1−θ
θ
(the upper
bound guaranteeing that φ(θ) ≤ 1 ∀θ). Making α independent of w accords
with our desire to disentangle risk aversion from income and will greatly
simplify the analysis. Using this formulation, type (w, θ) individual’s utility
function from insurance contract (π, δ) is
V (π, δ; θ, w) = w − π − (1 + α)(1− δ)θ (1)
and the reservation premium π = π(θ) solves
V (π, δ; θ, w) = V (0, 0; θ, w)
w − π − (1 + α)(1− δ)θ = w − (1 + α)θ,
so that
π(θ) = (1 + α)θδ. (2)
Therefore the reservation premium exceeds the expected payout from
the insurance company by a multiplicative factor α. This indicates that risk
aversion in our model takes the form of a relative markup (i.e., the ratio
between the price markup and the fair price): α = (π(θ)− θδ)/θδ.
3 Social insurance vs private insurance
In this section, private and social insurance are mutually exclusive. The
mandatory social insurance policy offers full coverage δu = 1 with a premium
12Doherty and Eeckhoudt (1995) derive this result and other properties of optimal
insurance in the case of Yaari’s dual model.
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πu(w) proportional to income but not related to individual risks.13 To break
even the average premium must be equal to the average expected payout,∫
w π
u(w)dG(w) = θµ with individual premium πu(w) = wwµ θµ. We then
obtain the following payoff from social insurance for an agent with risk θ
and income w :
V (δu, πu(w); θ, w) = w − ( w
wµ
) θµ. (3)
Alternatively, voluntary private insurance may be provided by insurance
companies. They offer a set of separating zero-profit contracts {δ(θ), π(θ)}θ∈[θ,θ],
where δ(θ) ∈ [0, 1] is the coverage rate and π(θ) is the premium for a con-
sumer with risk θ. In a fully separating equilibrium, each type θ ∈ [0, 1]
then selects the policy intended for her and each contract will break even.
This requires to satisfy the following set of self-selection constraints: For all
θ and θˆ with θˆ = θ,
V (δ (θ) , π (θ) ; θ, w) = w − π (θ)− (1 + α) (1− δ (θ))θ
≥ V (δ(θˆ), π(θˆ); θ, w) = w − π(θˆ)− (1 + α) (1− δ(θˆ))θ
Using the zero-profit condition (due to perfect competition among risk
neutral insurance companies) every agent with risk θ is facing actuarially
fair premium: π(θ) = δ(θ)θ. Incorporating this into the self-selection con-
straints, we obtain for all θˆ = θ
V (δ (θ) , π (θ) ; θ, w) = w − δ(θ)θ − (1 + α) (1− δ (θ))θ
≥ V (δ(θˆ), π(θˆ); θ, w) = w − δ(θˆ)θˆ − (1 + α) (1− δ(θˆ))θ
We follow the incentive compatibility approach of Mailath (1987). A
necessary condition for a separating equilibrium is that the following local
incentive compatibility conditions hold: for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]
[
∂V (δ(θˆ), π(θˆ); θ, w)
∂θˆ
]
θˆ→θ
= −δ′(θ)θ − δ(θ) + (1 + α)δ′(θ)θ = 0
= δ′(θ)[(1 + α)θ − θ]− δ(θ) = 0.
13The assumption of proportional taxation is consistent with the way social insurance is
financed in many countries through payroll taxes. We do however consider more general
form of financing in Section 5.
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In other words, any separating equilibrium requires that no type be able to
obtain a strictly higher payoff by announcing another arbitrary close type.
¿From Mailath (1987), we see that the payoff functions are such that these
local necessary conditions are also sufficient. Hence the equilibrium coverage
rate function δ(θ) is the solution to the following differential equation,
δ′(θ) =
δ(θ)
αθ
∀θ ∈ [θ, θ]
Solving this equation and using the terminal condition δ(θ) = 1 for
efficiency, we get the equilibrium coverage function
δ∗(θ) =
(
θ/θ
)1/α
with the corresponding equilibrium premium function,
π∗(θ) = δ∗(θ)θ = θ
(
θ/θ
)1/α
The fact that
(
θ/θ
)1/α
< 1 for all θ < θ reflects the inherent incom-
plete coverage resulting from the adverse selection problem on the private
insurance market. The policy menu {δ∗(θ), π∗(θ)}θ∈[0,1] characterises the
unique efficient separating zero-profit equilibrium in this continuous-type
insurance model.14 Plugging the equilibrium separating contracts into the
payoff functions we get
V (δ∗(θ), π∗(θ); θ, w) = w − π∗(θ)− (1 + α)(1− δ∗(θ))θ
= w − (1 + α)θ + αθ
(
θ/θ
)1/α
(4)
14This separating equilibrium may not be a Nash equilibrium (between insurance com-
panies). A sufficient condition for existence of a Nash equilibrium is that the marginal
screening cost (trading lower coverage for lower premium), for different types must decline
rapidly enough as type quality increases (Riley, 1985). When probabilities of accident
are small, this condition is likely to be met (Riley, 1985). An alternative approach to
the problem of non-existence of a Nash equilibrium is to introduce an additional stability
property about the reactions to defections, leading to the so-called Reactive equilibrium
(Riley, 1979). In Engers and Fernandez (1987) it is shown that, under the assumptions
of our model, the set of efficient, zero-profit, separating contracts is the unique Reactive
equilibrium. That is, it is possible to show that, for any new contract offered by a defect-
ing insurance company, there is a corresponding reaction contract that yields profit for
the reacting firm and produces losses for the defecting one.
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Comparing (4) and (3) reveals that for each θ ∈ [θ, θ] there exists a
critical income level w = w◦(θ, α, θµ, θ, wµ) such that individual with risk
θ and income w◦(θ, ·) is indifferent between social insurance and private
insurance. Given α, θµ and wµ, for each θ ∈ [θ, θ] , w = w◦(θ; ·) solves
w − (1 + α)θ + αθ
(
θ/θ
)1/α
= w − ( w
wµ
) θµ
or
w◦(θ; ·)
wµ
= (1 + ϕ(α, θ))
θ
θµ
(5)
where ϕ(α, θ) ≡ α(1 − (θ/θ)1/α) ≥ 0 is the efficiency gain from social in-
surance as measured by the extra coverage 1− (θ/θ)1/α evaluated according
to the degree of risk aversion α. Mandatory social insurance deals better
with adverse selection than voluntary private insurance and can provide
better coverage. However social insurance also operates redistribution both
from low risk to high risk and from high income to low income. Clearly
all those individuals with above average risk and below average income will
prefer social insurance both for efficiency and redistributive reasons. Some
of those below average risk may also prefer social insurance if their income is
sufficiently below the average so that income redistribution dominates risk
redistribution. Indeed for any risk θ all individuals with income w ≤ w◦(θ; ·)
would prefer social insurance over private insurance whereas all those with
w > w◦(θ; ·) would prefer private insurance. The political support for social
insurance is then given by
S = {(θ, w) : θ ≤ θ ≤ θ and w ≤ w ≤ w◦(θ; ·)}
Note from (5) that some individuals slightly richer than the average (w >
wµ) and below the average risk (θ < θµ) may still prefer social insurance.
This is because of the efficiency gain of social insurance. The indifferent
voters correspond to the set of types (θ, w) satisfying equation (5). This
equation defines the switching curve between private and social insurance
in the (θ, w)-space. Simple inspection reveals that w◦(0; ·) = 0 and that for
α > 0, w◦(θ; ·) > wµ for all θ ≥ θµ.
Increasing the risk θ affects individual preference for social insurance
in two opposite ways. First, it makes the pooling of risks more appealing.
Second, it decreases the efficiency gain from social insurance as measured by
ϕ(α, θ), since higher risks benefit from better private coverage. However it
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is easily verified that the first effect always dominates except for the highest
risks. Formally,
∂w◦/∂θ
{
≥
<
}
0 for θ
{
≤
>
}
θ
1+α
,
The position of the switching curve also depends on risk aversion α, mean
income wµ, and mean risk θµ. Indeed it appears immediately from equation
(5) that for all θ, w◦(θ; ·) is increasing in wµ and decreasing in θµ and that
w◦(θ; ·) is unaffected by mean preserving changes in the joint distribution
H(θ, w). It can also be verified that for each θ, w◦(θ; ·) is increasing in α.15
As an illustration, Figure 1 reports the relative critical wage, w◦/wµ, as
a function of the relative risk, θ/θµ, for various degrees of risk aversion (and
θµ = 1/3, wµ = 2 and θ¯ = 2/3).
[Insert Figure 1]
It is now straightforward to obtain the condition on the distribution of
types and risk aversion such that a majority of individuals favour social
insurance.
Proposition 1 There is a majority support for social insurance against pri-
vate insurance if and only if
∫ θ
θ
∫ w◦(θ;·)
w
dH(θ, w) ≥ 1/2
where w◦(θ; ·) is increasing in θ for all θ ≤ θ1+α and where risk aversion
(α > 0) implies that w◦(θ; ·) > wµ for all θ ≥ θµ. Moreover for each
θ ∈ [θ, θ] the upper bound w◦(θ; ·) is increasing in α so that more risk aver-
sion increases the political support for social insurance.
It is extremely difficult to obtain explicit conditions on the joint distri-
bution of types such that a majority prefers social insurance. However there
is one special case in which strong results are obtainable without simula-
tion. Suppose that risk and income are independently distributed according
15From equation (5), sign{∂w◦/∂α} = sign{1 +
(
θ/θ
)1/α
( log θ/θ
α
− 1)} > 0. This last
inequality requires log(θ/θ)1/α + 1
(θ/θ)1/α
> 1 which holds for all θ since the left hand side
decreases with θ and converges to 1 when θ tends towards θ¯.
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to symmetric marginal distributions, F (θ) and G(w). Suppose also for a
moment that there is no risk aversion. Setting α = 0, the indifference condi-
tion becomes w
◦(θ;·)
wµ
= θθµ and all those with
w
wµ
≤ θθµ prefer social insurance
whereas all those with wwµ >
θ
θµ
prefer private insurance. By the symmetry
of the marginal distributions and the absence of correlation between income
and risk we have Pr(θ, w : wwµ ≤ θθµ ) = Pr(θ, w : wwµ > θθµ ) = 1/2. But from
Proposition 1 the support for social insurance increases with risk aversion,
therefore we have that strictly more than one half of the population will
prefer social insurance when α > 0. To sum up:
Proposition 2 Suppose that risk and income are uncorrelated and symmet-
rically distributed, then for any α > 0 there is a strict majority support for
social insurance against private insurance.
Keeping the assumption that θ and w are independently distributed
we now relax the symmetry hypothesis. We first assume that the income
distribution is positively skewed but we maintain the symmetry of the risk
distribution. We expect as a result of this asymmetry a greater political
support for social insurance because more individuals would then benefit
from the income redistribution involved in social insurance. This is confirmed
by Table 1, which shows the political support for social insurance when risks
are symmetrically distributed and income levels are drawn from a Beta(a, b)
distribution. If a > 1 and b > 1 the distribution is unimodal; if α < 1 and
β < 1 it is U-shaped, and if α = β = 1 it is the uniform distribution. The
degree of skewness increases with the difference | a − b |. The distribution
is symmetric if a = b , positively skewed if a < b and negatively skewed if
a > b.
Table 1: Support for social insurance with uncorrelated risk and income
(symmetric risk distribution and positively skewed income distribution)16
b wm/wµ α = 0 α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 1/3
2 1 50.00% 55.80% 60.41% 65.73%
3 0.981 50.27% 56.23% 61.52% 66.20%
5 0.970 50.63% 57.02% 62.23% 66.90%
10 0.963 50.83% 57.47% 62.27% 67.20%
Continuing with uncorrelated income and risk we could expect a greater
support for social insurance with a negatively skewed distribution of risk
16w = 3x + 1 with x ∼ Beta(2, b) so that w ∈ [1, 4]
θ = 2y/3 with y ∼ Beta(2, 2) so that θ ∈ [0, 2/3]
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since this increases the number of individuals above the mean risk who then
benefit from the redistribution across risks. This is indeed verified by the
results presented in Table 2 where increasing the parameter a increases the
negative skewness of the distribution of risks and raises the political support
of social insurance. This Table also shows how positive skewness of income
distribution and negative skewness of risk distribution reinforce each other
in favouring social insurance.
Table 2: Support for social insurance with uncorrelated risk and income
(negatively skewed distribution of risk and positively skewed distribution
of income)17
a θm/θµ α = 0 α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 1/3
2 1 50.27% 56.23% 61.52% 66.20%
3 1.023 51.08% 59.13% 65.00% 69.97%
5 1.031 52.12% 61.58% 66.78% 70.85%
10 1.033 52.28% 62.32% 66.88% 71.08%
We now study the effect of introducing some correlation between income
and risk. To do this, we compute the proportion of individuals favouring
social insurance when risks are symmetrically distributed and income distri-
bution is skewed to the right according to parameter b. For every degree of
skewness b ∈ {2, 3, 5, 10}, we report in Table 3 the political support for social
insurance for each degree of correlation corr(w, θ) ∈ {−0.99, 0,+0.99}.
The result we obtain is that, irrespective of the skewness of the income
distribution (i.e. the value of b), increasing the correlation between risk and
income increases the political support for social insurance in the presence
of risk aversion. Moreover the effect of correlation is accentuated by risk
aversion. Indeed without risk aversion the correlation of income and risk
has little effect on the support for social insurance. To understand why
positive correlation is more favourable to social insurance, consider Figure
1 which depicts w◦/wµ as a function of θ/θµ for different values of α. When
α = 0, the switching line corresponds to the 45◦ line, w◦/wµ = θ/θµ and the
correlation between w and θ does not affect much the probability masses on
both sides of this line. Positive correlation has only the effect of tightening
the link between benefits and contributions. But when α increases, the
switching line bulges northward, inducing some individuals just above the
45◦ line to switch their support in favour of social insurance. Since positive
correlation between w and θ results in a higher proportion of individuals
17w = 3x + 1 with x ∼ Beta(2, 3) so that w ∈ [1, 4]
θ = 2y/3 with y ∼ Beta(a, 2) so that θ ∈ [0, 2/3]
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distributed around the 45◦ line compared to negative correlation, it follows
that the political support for social insurance is higher when income and
risk are positively correlated.
Table 3: Support for social insurance with correlated income and risk
(symmetric distribution of risk and positively skewed distribution of
income)18
b corr(w,θ) α = 0 α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 1/3
2 -0.99 50.05% 54.37% 58.08% 62.17%
2 0 50.00% 55.80% 60.41% 65.73%
2 0.99 50.37% 64.18% 74.08% 80.57%
3 -0.99 50.90% 55.33% 59.30% 62.97%
3 0 50.27% 56.23% 61.52% 66.20%
3 0.99 53.00% 65.90% 73.88% 81.43%
5 -0.99 51.42% 56.00% 60.02% 63.92%
5 0 50.63% 57.02% 62.23% 66.90%
5 0.99 54.00% 66.33% 73.65% 80.08%
10 -0.99 51.95% 56.82% 61.08% 65.02%
10 0 50.83% 57.47% 62.27% 67.20%
10 0.99 54.48% 63.72% 70.73% 76.15%
4 Impossibility of top-up system
In this section we introduce the possibility of supplementing social insurance
with voluntary private insurance. We show that all individuals either prefer
full social insurance or no social insurance at all. In other words, no one
will vote for a partial social insurance complemented by voluntary private
insurance.
Let δu ∈ [0, 1] and πu(w) = δu wwµ θµ be the redistributive social insurance
policy. Individuals can freely supplement this public insurance with a private
insurance leading to a total coverage for type θ equal to δ(θ) where the extra
private coverage δ(θ)−δu is purchased at a fair price (δ(θ)−δu)θ and satisfies
the incentive compatibility constraints. The corresponding payoff function
for an individual with risk θ and income w is,
V (δu, πu(w), δ(θ), π(θ); θ, w) = w − δu w
wµ
θµ − (δ(θ)− δu)θ
18w = 3x + 1 with x ∼ Beta(2, b) so that w ∈ [1, 4]
θ = 2y/3 with y ∼ Beta(2, 2) so that θ ∈ [0, 2/3]
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−(1 + α)(1− δ(θ))θ
In any separating equilibrium, the following necessary local incentive
compatibility condition must hold: for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]
[
∂V (δu, πu(w), δ(θˆ), π(θˆ); θ, w)
∂θˆ
]
θˆ→θ
= −(δ(θ)− δu)− δ′(θ)θ + (1 + α)δ′(θ)θ
= αθδ′(θ)− (δ(θ)− δu) = 0
From Mailath(1987), it is easily seen that the payoff functions are such
that the local incentive compatibility condition is also sufficient, implying
that the solution to the equation above defines the separating equilibrium
for the continuous-type case. Hence the separating equilibrium coverage rate
function δ(θ) solves the following differential equation,
δ′(θ) =
δ(θ)
αθ
− δ
u
αθ
∀θ ∈ [θ, θ]
Setting δ(θ) = 1 for efficiency, the unique solution is,
δ∗(θ) = (1− δu)
(
θ/θ
)1/α
+ δu.
In particular, setting δu = 0 we get the same expression for δ∗(θ) as in the
previous section. Notice that in equilibrium, for all types total coverage is
increasing with social insurance coverage δu since (θ/θ)1/α < 1 for all θ < θ.
Hence private insurance decisions are affected by the level of social insurance
coverage but there is no complete crowding out of private insurance by
social insurance. This is because social insurance cross-subsidises high
risks and thereby enables private insurance to offer better coverage to low
risks without violating the incentive constraints, making possibly both high
risks and low risks individuals better off.19 We shall see shortly that this
complementarity between private and public insurance is not enough to
favour a mixed system.
Inserting this equilibrium policy into the payoff function we get
V (δu, πu(w), δ∗(θ), π∗(θ); θ, w) = w − δu w
wµ
θµ − (δ∗(θ)− δu)θ
19See Eckstein et al., 1985, for a similar result with VNM preferences.
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−(1 + α)(1− δ∗(θ))θ
= w − δu w
wµ
θµ − (1− δu)
(
θ/θ
)1/α
θ
−(1 + α)(1− δu − (1− δu)
(
θ/θ
)1/α
)θ
Differentiating the above payoff functions with respect to δu we get
∂V (·)
∂δu
= (θ − w
wµ
θµ) + αθ
[
1−
(
θ/θ
)1/α]
.
This expression being independent of δu, individuals have corner preferences
with respect to δu. Moreover it is easily seen that for any θ ∈ [θ, θ], there
exists an agent with a critical income w = w◦(θ, α, θµ, θ, wµ) who is indiffer-
ent to any change in the public coverage rate δu. Notice that this marginal
type is the same as in the previous section where social insurance coverage
was set equal to one, see equation(5). This equivalence is due to the fact
that the preference for social insurance is independent of the level of public
coverage. Finally, notice that for each θ all those with income w < w◦(θ; ·)
prefer full public coverage and all those with income w ≥ w◦(θ; ·) prefer zero
public coverage. Therefore depending on the probability mass of each group,
a majority prefers either no social insurance at all, or full social insurance.
In this sense, there is a complete political resistance to a mixed system un-
der the dual theory, unless there are some other incentive considerations
preventing full public coverage (e.g., moral hazard and distortionary effect
of social insurance) or no social insurance at all (e.g., universal access to
basic insurance).
We are now in a position to state the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that agents can supplement social insurance with
private insurance and that they vote on the degree of social insurance cov-
erage. Then under the dual theory of risk, for any joint distribution of risk
and income in the population, a majority would favour either full social
insurance or no social insurance at all. Therefore mixed insurance is not
politically sustainable unless complete public coverage is precluded for some
incentive reasons.
This result stands in sharp contrast to previous work showing that there
is always a majority in favour of a mixed insurance even if full public coverage
is possible. The reason of the difference lies in our adopting the dual theory
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of risk. In Yaari’s dual model, where risk aversion is of the first order, it is
optimal to buy full insurance even if the premium is slightly above the fair
price. This is because the agents derive positive benefit from the last unit of
coverage. In contrast under the expected utility model, where risk aversion
is of the second order, the last unit of coverage has zero benefit and thus
nobody will buy full insurance above the fair price. This means that in most
cases the majority will only demand partial social insurance which high risk
individuals will find profitable to top up with some private insurance.
It would be a misinterpretation of Proposition 3 to dismiss the dual
theory on the grounds that mixed insurance exists in the real world. The
result that there cannot be a majority support for a mixed system is not
to be taken as a general feature of the dual theory of risk aversion. For
instance, introducing distortionary financing of social insurance would make
additional social insurance coverage increasingly costly and could lead a ma-
jority of voters to support mixed insurance. The main point of proposition
3 is rather that the previous work, using the expected utility, may have
overestimated the political demand for mixed insurance. Our result thus
suggests that the political demand for a mixed system relies heavily on the
modelling of choice under uncertainty.
It is also important to note that the case for a political support for
mixed insurance made in previous work such as Anderberg (1999) and Gou-
veia (1997) rests also on the assumption of pooling insurance on the private
market. With pooling private insurance, public provision is less appealing as
it adversely affects the price of private insurance by crowding out the good
risks from the market. This is not the case in our model, where the price
of fully separating private contracts is not affected by social insurance. The
assumption of uniform pricing of private insurance is difficult to defend be-
cause individuals actually reveal their type by purchasing different amounts
of insurance, so that insurance companies could gain by exploiting this in-
formation. This constitutes a second reason why the previous literature may
have overestimated the political support for mixed insurance.
5 Effects of changing the degree of redistribution
In this section we extend our analysis to allow for different degrees of redis-
tribution of social insurance. To do so we suppose that the social insurance
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premium for a coverage rate δu ∈ [0, 1] is
πu(w; γ) =
(
γ
w
wµ
+ (1− γ)
)
δuθµ
where γ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the degree of income redistribution of social in-
surance. Hence the previous section corresponds to the special case of
maximum redistribution γ = 1. For the minimum redistribution case γ = 0
social insurance no longer redistributes between incomes. The latter case
corresponds to an equivalence principle where expected insurance benefits
are proportional to contributions. Our intention is to capture some feature
of insurance against earnings loss which is much less redistributive even if
contributions are proportional to income simply because the benefit is also
proportional to income. We first study the case of voting over social insur-
ance against private insurance before analysing the possibility to vote over
the degree of private and social insurance mix.
5.1 Social insurance versus private insurance
Since private insurance is exclusive from social insurance, the degree of redis-
tribution of social insurance does not affect the separating private insurance
contracts, and thus the payoff function from private insurance is the same
as in (4). On the other hand the payoff associated to full social insurance
becomes,
V (πu(w; γ); θ, w) = w − πu(w; γ)
= w −
(
γ
w
wµ
+ (1− γ)
)
θµ (6)
Comparing (6) and (4) and fixing the degree of redistribution γ ∈ [0, 1],
we can derive for each θ the marginal type w = w◦γ(θ, α, θµ, θ, wµ) who is
indifferent between private and social insurance as the solution to
αθ(1− (θ/θ¯)1/α) + θ = γ w
wµ
θµ + (1− γ)θµ.
It follows that
γ
w◦γ(θ; ·)
wµ
+ (1− γ) = (1 + ϕ(α, θ)) θ
θµ
(7)
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where ϕ(α, θ) = α(1 − (θ/θ¯)1/α) > 0 is the same efficiency gain of social
insurance as before. This generalises the indifference condition to various
degrees of redistribution. In particular for γ = 1 we recover condition (5).
At the other extreme for γ = 0, condition (7) is independent of income since
in this case social insurance only redistributes across risks. This condition
then suggests that even some individuals just below the mean risk may
prefer social insurance due to efficiency gain (i.e., social insurance offers them
better coverage relative to private insurance). Evidently all those agents
with risk θ and income w such that w ≤ w◦γ(θ; ·) prefer social insurance over
private insurance and vice versa. We verify that w◦γ(θ; ·) is increasing in θ
almost everywhere and that it is above the mean income for any risk level
above the average. Straightforward differentiation also gives that w◦γ(θ; ·)
is increasing with risk aversion and mean income but is decreasing with
average risk.
We then obtain the following proposition which extends proposition 1 to
any degree of redistribution.
Proposition 4 There is a majority support for social insurance against pri-
vate insurance if and only if
∫ θ
θ
∫ w◦γ(θ;·)
w
dH(θ, w) ≥ 1/2
where w◦γ(θ; ·) is increasing in θ almost everywhere and risk aversion (α > 0)
implies that w◦γ(θ; ·) > wµ for all θ ≥ θµ. Moreover w◦γ(θ; ·) is increasing in
α for each θ ∈ [θ, θ) and so more risk aversion increases the political support
for social insurance.
As for the effect of a change in γ on the indifference condition we get that
increasing γ (more redistribution) induces a clockwise rotation of w◦γ(θ; ·)
around w = wµ in the (θ/θµ, w/wµ)-space. The reason is that a larger γ
increases the importance of income in the preference for social insurance
leading some low risk individuals below the mean income to switch their
vote for social insurance but leading also some high risk individuals above
the average income to switch to private insurance.
Table 4 shows the percentage of the population favouring social insur-
ance for various (α,γ) when w and θ are not correlated with symmetric
distribution of risk and positively skewed distribution of income. It reveals
that there is always a strict majority in favour of social insurance except
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when α = γ = 0 (i.e., no efficiency and income redistribution effect). More-
over the size of this majority is increasing with risk aversion (α) but rather
unaffected by the degree of redistribution of social insurance (γ). This is
true even though the median income is less than the mean income.
Table 4: Social insurance support with uncorrelated risk and income
as a function of redistributiveness and risk aversion20
α = 0 α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 1/3
γ = 0 50.00% 56.73% 62.37% 67.97%
γ = 1/4 50.03% 56.68% 62.22% 67.75%
γ = 1/2 50.10% 56.52% 61.93% 67.37%
γ = 3/4 50.23% 56.33% 61.75% 66.78%
γ = 1 50.27% 56.23% 61.52% 66.20%
We may wonder whether some correlation between income and risk could
increase the sensitivity of the social insurance support to the degree of in-
come redistribution. With positive correlation income redistribution and
risk redistribution work in opposite directions: those with low incomes ben-
efit from income redistribution but since they face low risks, they also sub-
sidise higher risks. Therefore their preference for social insurance is weaker
that in the case of negative correlation where both income and risk redistri-
bution reinforce each other. We should then expect a change in the degree
of income redistribution to have more effect with positive correlation than
negative correlation. Table 5 shows that this is the case. Under negative
correlation the support of social insurance is almost independent of the de-
gree of redistribution. By contrast, when correlation is positive intensifying
income redistribution increases significantly the social insurance support,
especially when risk aversion is high.
Table 5: Social insurance support with correlated risk and income
as a function of correlation, redistributiveness and risk aversion21
20w = 3x + 1 with x ∼ Beta(2, 3) so that w ∈ [1, 4]
θ = 2y/3 with y ∼ Beta(2, 2) so that θ ∈ [0, 2/3]
21w = 3x + 1 with x ∼ Beta(2, 3) so that w ∈ [1, 4]
θ = 2y/3 with y ∼ Beta(2, 2) so that θ ∈ [0, 2/3]
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corr(w, θ) α = 0 α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 1/3
-1 γ = 0 50.00% 56.73% 62.37% 67.97%
γ = 1/4 50.33% 56.17% 61.35% 66.28%
γ = 1/2 50.55% 55.85% 60.57% 64.97%
γ = 3/4 50.72% 55.62% 59.90% 63.85%
γ = 1 50.90% 55.33% 59.30% 62.97%
+1 γ = 0 50.00% 56.73% 62.37% 67.97%
γ = 1/4 50.38% 58.18% 64.18% 70.37%
γ = 1/2 50.92% 60.20% 66.67% 72.90%
γ = 3/4 51.58% 62.32% 70.23% 76.23%
γ = 1 53.00% 65.90% 73.88% 81.43%
5.2 Impossibility of top-up
We now show that the impossibility of mixed insurance extends to any degree
of redistribution of social insurance. Following the same line of reasoning
as in Section 4, and changing the social insurance premium to πu(w; γ) =
(γ wwµ +(1−γ))δuθµ, we obtain the following payoff function for an individual
with risk θ and income w:
V (δu, πu(w; γ), δ(θ), π(θ); θ, w) = w −
(
γ
w
wµ
+ 1− γ
)
δu θµ − (δ(θ)− δu)θ
−(1 + α)(1− δ(θ))θ
In any separating equilibrium, the following necessary local incentive
compatibility condition must hold: for all θ
[
∂V (δu, πu(w; γ), δ(θˆ), π(θˆ); θ, w)
∂θˆ
]
θˆ→θ
= (1 + α)δ′(θ)θ − δ′(θ)θ − (δ(θ)− δu)
= αθδ′(θ)− (δ(θ)− δu) = 0
This expression is the same as the one obtained in Section 4 and so the
set of separating private insurance contracts is unaffected by the degree of
redistribution of social insurance. Changing γ has no effect on the private
insurance market. Using this separability property, we can plug the equilib-
rium private insurance contract derived in Section 4 into the payoff functions
to get,
V (δu, πu(w; γ), δ∗(θ), π∗(θ); θ, w) = w −
(
γ
w
wµ
+ 1− γ
)
δuθµ − (1− δu)(θ/θ)1/αθ
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−(1 + α)
[
1− (1− δu)(θ/θ)1/α − δu
]
θ
Differentiating with respect to δu ∈ [0, 1] we obtain,
∂V (·)
∂δu
= θ − (γ w
wµ
+ 1− γ) θµ + αθ
[
1− (θ/θ)1/α
]
(8)
Since this expression is independent of δu, for any degree of redistribution
γ ∈ [0, 1] individuals have corner solution in terms of their preference for δu,
with a majority in favour of either no social insurance or full social insurance.
Furthermore, the set of individuals preferring full social insurance is the same
as when social and private insurance are mutually exclusive options, as can
be seen by comparing (8) and (7). The next proposition follows immediately,
Proposition 5 Suppose that agents can supplement social insurance with
private insurance and that they vote on the degree of social insurance cov-
erage. Then for any joint distribution of risk and income in the population
and regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance, under the
dual theory of risk a majority favours either full social insurance or no so-
cial insurance at all. Mixing private and redistributive social insurance is
not politically sustainable unless complete public coverage is precluded for
some incentive reasons.
6 The importance of adverse selection
Adverse selection is clearly a key element in the political support for social
insurance. One implication of adverse selection is that voluntary insurance
can only offer incomplete coverage, which provides an efficiency case for
compulsory social insurance. We believe it is thus important to understand
the political feasibility of compulsory social insurance in the face of the
growing possibility for (private) insurers to detect individual risks through
genetic tests.22 To tackle this issue, we take the extreme view that it is
possible to observe individual risks and that the private market will offer
insurance contracts accordingly. Following the argument of the previous
section, we assume a compulsory social insurance of the form {δu, πu(w; γ)}
that can be supplemented by a voluntary private insurance at an actuarially
fair price. Then, any risk averse individual with income w and risk θ chooses
full coverage δ(θ) = 1, with the resulting payoff:
22See The Economist (19 October 2000) ”Insurance in the genetic age”, p23.
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V ∗(δu, πu(w; γ), δ∗(θ), π∗(θ); θ, w) = w −
(
γ
w
wµ
+ 1− γ
)
δu θµ − (1− δu)θ
Differentiating this expression with respect to δu ∈ [0, 1] we obtain
∂V ∗(·)
∂δu
= θ − (γ w
wµ
+ 1− γ) θµ (9)
Since (9) is independent of δu we still obtain that the majority favours
either a full social insurance or no social insurance at all. In other words, the
top-up system is also politically unfeasible with perfect private insurance.
Moreover the size of the group favouring social insurance decreases with
perfect private insurance in presence of risk aversion. This is easily seen
by comparing (8) and (9). In fact, the set of individuals favouring social
insurance is
{
(θ, w) : θ ≥ [γ w
wµ
+ (1− γ)]θµ
}
representing a percentage of the population equal to
∫ w
w
∫ θ
[γ w
wµ
+(1−γ)]θµ
dH(θ, w)
Notice that the set of those favouring social insurance is now independent
of risk aversion. This is because the existence of perfect private insurance
enables individuals to get full coverage on the private market. One can ask
whether, for correlated distributions of risk and income, a change in the
redistribution level of social insurance could shift the majority away from
social insurance. The answer is negative with a symmetrical risk distribution
and an income distribution skewed to the right. This is readily seen from
Table 5 setting α = 0 to neutralise for the adverse selection effect.
We can summarise our results on the political support for social insur-
ance in the absence of adverse selection in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose that there is no adverse selection. Agents can
supplement social insurance with perfect private insurance and vote on the
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degree of social insurance coverage. Then, mixing the two systems is never
politically feasible under the dual theory of risk, regardless of the joint dis-
tribution of risk and income and of the degree of redistribution of social
insurance. Moreover, the political support for social insurance is lower than
in the presence of adverse selection, and this support is independent of risk
aversion.
7 Conclusion
Most social insurance systems in the European Union and elsewhere include
a significant amount of income redistribution in addition to the redistribu-
tion across risk levels. This paper has addressed the important question
of the political support for social insurance in the presence of private al-
ternatives. The efficiency argument for social insurance is that, by making
insurance compulsory, it can overcome the adverse selection problems that
plague the private insurance market. Combining this efficiency argument
with the income redistribution effect of social insurance (due to income re-
lated contributions) and the risk redistribution effect (due to the pooling of
risks) we have shown that, for a large class of joint distributions of risk and
income in the population, there is a majority support for social insurance.
In addition, higher risk aversion implies more support for social insurance,
simply because adverse selection prevents private insurance from offering
full coverage. However, if we remove the adverse selection problem (say, be-
cause genetic tests can make individual risks known to the private insurance
companies) then the public support for social insurance will shrink and the
majority in favour of social insurance will become more fragile. We have also
shown that the so-called “top-up system” where individuals can voluntarily
supplement social insurance with some private insurance is not politically
sustainable in the sense that there is always a majority that would prefer
either full or no social insurance at all. This result is mostly a consequence of
our non-expected utility model but it suggests the more general point that
the political demand for mixed insurance depends heavily on the modelling
of risk aversion.
We should emphasise some limits of our analysis. The first is that we
have assumed away any moral hazard considerations. Typically, the moral
hazard problem is important in the insurance context and takes two different
dimensions: underprevention (insurance coverage reduces prevention efforts)
and overconsumption (insurance coverage inflates costs). In both cases,
moral hazard calls for the use of deductible and co-insurance. However
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public (compulsory) insurance and private (voluntary) insurance are equally
affected by this moral hazard problem, and so ignoring this aspect should
not really affect the choice between the two systems.
A more important criticism of our analysis concerns the benefits that
insurance provides. In this paper, we have assumed that all individuals face
the same potential damage (as in Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). While this
may seem a good approximation of health care systems, social insurance also
provides (sometimes jointly with the employers) compensation for earnings
loss. Introducing this aspect into the analysis will bring social insurance
closer to the equivalence principle according to which benefits are propor-
tional to contributions (both related to earnings). Since the consequence
of allowing insurance against earnings loss is to decrease the redistributive
effect of social insurance, then our results about the effect on the political
support for social insurance of changing its redistributive content are rele-
vant.
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Figure 1 : Critical value of w° Ew as a function of theta Etheta and of risk aversion
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